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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY
CHIPMAN,

Case No. 960194-CA

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Oral Argument Priority 15
vs.
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON
and KIM ANDERSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decree in a civil action.
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code
Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j)

(Supp.

1996).

This

Court

has pour-over

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees to a

party which prevailed in defeating the opposing claim for attorney
fees, where the opposing claim for fees was barred by statute and
controlling case law?

The trial court's finding of bad faith must

be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.
202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P. 2d

The trial court's legal conclusions

on the interpretation of the statute are reviewed for correctness.
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).

2.

Where plaintiffs entitled to an award of attorney fees

for prevailing in a quiet title action, where defendants did not
contest the quiet title claim after the filing of the complaint?
This is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness.
3.

Id.

Are defendants entitled to double costs and attorney fees

for responding to this appeal, where appellants' claims are barred
by controlling cases and where appellants have persisted in their
claims in bad faith?

This is an original issue addressed to this

Court.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 11:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name who is duly licensed to
practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's
address also shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his
address.
Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is
abolished.
The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certification by him that
he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information,
and
belief
formed
after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith
argument
for
the
extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
2

cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion,
or other paper,
including
a
reasonable
attorney's fee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

judgment in a civil action.

This is an appeal from a final

Plaintiffs' complaint sought to quiet

title to real property and judgment for attorney fees.

Defendants

counterclaimed for attorney fees.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.

The

statement

procedural history.

of

facts

below

contains

a

more

detailed

This section present only a general overview.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint March 8, 1995. (R. 6-1.l)
Defendants answered and counterclaimed on April 18, 1995.
11,

21-17.)

The

defendants7

answers

consented

to

(R. 16-

Count

I of

plaintiffs7 complaint, denied the allegations supporting Count II,
and counterclaimed for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11 and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1988).

On May 1, 1995, plaintiffs filed a

*The papers in the trial court file are organized in reverse
chronological order, with the result that the record index numbers
for any particular document run in reverse order.
3

"Cross

Motion

for

Attorney's

Fees."

(R.

27.)

Both

parties

submitted briefs and affidavits on the attorney fee issues.
On May 25, 1995, plaintiffs requested that the trial court
rule on the pending motions.

On July 21, 1995, the trial court

entered a ruling denying plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and
awarding attorney fees to defendants in the amount of $484.00.

(R.

129-128.)
On September 51, 1995, plaintiffs objected to a proposed form
of judgment submitted by defendants (R. 138-134) and requested a
hearing "to verify the basis of the court's decision."

(R. 140.)

The trial court held the requested hearing on October 5, 1995, and
affirmed and explained the prior ruling. (R. 142-141.)

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 146-143) and an Order and Judgment
(R. 149-147) were entered November 16, 1995.2
their Notice of Appeal on December 12, 1995.
C.

Plaintiffs filed
(R. 160-159.)

Statement Of Facts.

Plaintiffs

present

a

long

and

disparaging

plaintiffs' version of the facts preceding

this

statement

of

lawsuit.

As

explained in Point I.B. below, Utah cases establish that the facts
prior to the lawsuit are irrelevant.

In addition, several of the

statements are supported only by citation to plaintiffs' legal

2

0n the
the findings
objection on
findings and

same day plaintiffs filed an objection to the form of
and order.
(R. 153-150.) Plaintiffs withdrew that
January 10, 1996, in order to avoid any claim that the
order were not final. (R. 177.)
4

memoranda

below, not by citation to any

admissible evidence.3

Defendants therefore object to but will not otherwise respond to
the claims in plaintiffs' brief relating to the period prior to the
lawsuit.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint March 8, 1995, seeking to
quiet title to certain property under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence,

and

further

seeking

(Complaint, copy attached.)
attorney

fees under

an

award

of

attorney

The prayer requested

a two-pronged

theory.

fees.

an award of

First,

plaintiffs

claimed that any defense to the action would be without merit and
that plaintiffs would be entitled to their attorney fees in that
event pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988).

Second,

plaintiffs alleged that if they prevailed in the action, then they
would be entitled to their reasonable attorney fees incurred in
prosecuting the action.

The complaint asserted no legal argument

to justify the claim for a prevailing-party award of fees.
In

response

to

the

complaint, defendants,

through

their

attorney, tendered a quit claim deed from Janice Miller and a
disclaimer of interest from the Andersons regarding the subject
property.

(R. 25-24.)

Janice Miller had record title to the

subject property; Andersons had never held nor claimed any interest
in the subject property.

(See R. 26-25; R. 89.)

3

Plaintiffs

E.g.,
the top lines on page 7 cite to R. 71, and the top
paragraph on page 9 cites to R. 69. These pages of the record are
part of a memorandum filed by plaintiffs, but are not supported by
affidavit or other admissible evidence.
5

refused

to

accept

the

quit

claim

deed

and

disclaimer

unless

defendants also paid plaintiffs' pre-complaint attorney fees.

(R.

24.)

and

Defendants

refused

(id.).

and

counterclaimed for Rule 11 sanctions.4

defendants

answered

(R. 16-11, 21-17.)

After extensive briefing and additional affidavits from both
parties, the matter was submitted to the court for decision and the
court issued a ruling denying the plaintiffs' request for attorney
fees and awarding defendants $484.00 in attorney fees.
128.)

(R. 129-

Defendants had requested attorney fees of $921.50, which

included all the fees incurred by defendants subsequent to the
filing of the complaint.

(R. 124-123.)

The court

disallowed

defendants' fees incurred in answering the complaint and awarded
only the fees incurred in responding to plaintiffs' requests for
attorney fees.

(R. 145, 165.)

The attorney fees thus awarded

included only the following:

J

Description

5/04/95

Memorandum: opposition
to motion (clerk)

5.50

$165.00

5/05/95

Review pleadings; proof
brief

.75

93.75

4

hours

fee

Date

Plaintiffs criticize defendants for filing their answers and
counterclaims on April 18, 1995, and claim plaintiffs had granted
an extension until April 21 in order to allow plaintiffs to
consider whether to pursue their claim for attorney fees.
The
affidavit of Craig M. Snyder filed with the answers and
counterclaims disputes plaintiffs' claim, and asserts that
plaintiffs' counsel stated, on April 18, that plaintiffs intended
to pursue their claim for attorney fees.
(R. 24.)
Even if
plaintiffs' version of the facts were correct, defendants are not
aware of any requirement that they wait until the last possible
moment to file an answer.
6

5/05/95

Memorandum: opposition
to motion (clerk)

2.30

69.00

5/08/95

Pleadings - reply to
motion

1.25

156.25

Total

9.80

$484.00 |

(R. 124-123.)

Plaintiff appealed from the $484.00 award.

(R. 160-

159.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs prevailed on their quiet title claims, but were not
entitled to an award of attorney fees.

Two prior Utah Supreme

Court decisions establish there is no cause of action for wrongful
refusal to disclaim an interest in property.
Defendants prevailed in defending the plaintiffs' claim for
attorney

fees,

and were properly

incurred

in the defense.

awarded

their

Plaintiffs' claim

attorney

fees

for attorney

fees

lacked merit, and plaintiffs persisted in the claim in bad faith.
Defendants should be awarded their fees incurred in responding
to this appeal.

The relief sought is barred by two prior Utah

Supreme Court decisions, and plaintiffs do not seek to have those
decisions overruled or modified.

The appeal is made in bad faith.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS WERE THE PREVAILING PARTIES
ON THE ATTORNEY FEE ISSUES, AND
THE AWARD OF FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
A.

Defendants were the prevailing party on the attorney fee

issue.
The trial court awarded attorney fees to defendants based on
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992), which authorizes an award of fees
to a prevailing party if the offending claim both lacks merit and
was made in bad faith.

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah

1983).
Section I of plaintiffs' brief argues that plaintiffs, not
defendants, were the prevailing parties, and that Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56 doesn't apply.

This is true as to Count I, but not as to

Count II of plaintiffs7 complaint.

The First Cause of Action

alleged that title should be quieted in plaintiffs.

The Second

Cause of Action alleged that plaintiffs should be awarded attorney
fees, including attorney fees incurred prior to the filing of the
complaint.

Plaintiffs obtained the relief sought on the first

cause of action, but defendants were the prevailing party on the
second cause of action.
Plaintiffs cite Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636
P. 2d 1034 (Utah 1981) , to support their argument that they were the
prevailing party below.

Highland involved a situation where the

defendant initially denied liability and then, 163 days into the
8

action, voluntarily paid a portion of disputed claim.

The case is

not relevant to this quiet title case where defendants
contested plaintiffs' First Cause of Action.
Ann. § 78-40-3

never

Based on Utah Code

(1992), which prohibits an award of costs under

these circumstances, it is evident that the legislature intended
that a non-disputing party in a quiet title action be treated
differently than a prevailing party in non-quiet-title contested
civil action.
Although Highland does not help plaintiffs' prevailing party
argument,

the

case

prevailing parties

does

illustrates

in a lawsuit.

that

there

can

Highland was an

be

two

excavating

subcontractor and performed work on a road project for Stevenson,
the general contractor.

Highland claimed that it was entitled to

additional

by

compensation

reason

of

particular

adverse

soil

conditions and certain acts of Stevenson and sued to recover that
additional compensation.

Highland also sought recovery of certain

amounts that were unpaid under the original contract.

Stevenson

counterclaimed to recover extra amounts that Stevenson had to pay
to complete the work after Highland pulled off the job.
days

after

the

lawsuit was

filed,

Stevenson

Only 164

voluntarily

Highland $10,3 00.78 of the amount Highland was claiming.

paid

The case

proceeded to trial and resulted in a finding that Highland had
breached its contract and that Stevenson was entitled to recovery
on its counterclaim.

The trial court awarded attorney fees to

Stevenson, but none to Highland.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed

9

most of the trial court's judgment but remanded for an award of
attorney

fees

in favor

of Highland,

holding

that

it was

the

prevailing party on one issue, even though Stevenson prevailed on
its counterclaim.

636 P.2d at 1038.

Similarly, in the instant case it was proper for the trial
court to hold that defendants were the prevailing party on the
second cause of action, even though plaintiffs obtained the relief
sought on the first cause of action.
B.

Plaintiffs' Claim For Attorney Fees Was Without Merit.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' appeal is a claim that Janice
Miller had an obligation to assist plaintiffs in their efforts to
quiet title to their property, and that she can be held liable for
failing to execute a quit claim deed.

This contention has no merit

and has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court on at least two
occasions.

In Draper v. J. B. & R. B. Walker, Inc., 115 Utah 368,

204 P.2d 826 (1949), the defendant had lawfully recorded a mortgage
against plaintiff's property, based on a claimed tax title held by
the mortgagor.

The mortgagor's tax title was later held invalid,

which also had the effect of invalidating the mortgage.

Because

the mortgage still appeared of record, however, it clouded title
and prevented
needed.

plaintiff

from obtaining

a

loan which he badly

Plaintiff expended substantial time and money attempting

to persuade defendant to release of record the obviously invalid
mortgage, but defendant refused to do so. Plaintiff then sued, and
the trial court awarded damages.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed,

10

relying

on

a

common

law

rule

that

a person

has

no

duty

to

affirmatively disclaim an invalid interest:
If, however, there is no duty to affirmatively
act, but only to disclaim in event of suit,
then no recovery may be had regardless of the
unreasonableness of the refusal.
At the
common law, no action for damages would lie
because of a refusal to release a mortgage or
discharge a lien or claim against property.
204 P.2d at 829 (citations omitted).
This rule was more recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P. 2d 1131 (Utah
1988).

Nield had a recorded interest against property, but the

interest was worthless because it was junior to a prior mortgage
and the value of the property was apparently less than the amount
of the prior mortgage.

Nield refused to release his interest of

record until after he was sued.

The trial court awarded damages

for his failure to clear title to the property, but the Utah
Supreme Court reversed.

The Court stated:

There is no basis in law for this award.
Quiet title actions are statutory in nature,
Holland
v. Wilson,
8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250
(1958), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-40-1 through
-13 (1987), authorizing quiet title actions,
does not include any remedies for refusing to
release title.
751 P.2d at 1133.
The trial court did not rely on these cases, but instead
relied on the prohibition of an award of costs in Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-3 (1992) .

Plaintiffs claim error, and argue that attorney

fees are not costs. Plaintiffs apparently argue that attorney fees

11

could be awarded even though the statute prohibits an award of
costs.

Plaintiffs have not cited any case which would support that

proposition and defendants are not aware of any support for such a
claim.

This Court has previously recognized that "[a]ttorney fees

are more properly considered costs11 as opposed to damages.

Arnica

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

Logic decrees that if the statute prohibits even an award

of costs, an award of attorney fees would likewise be unavailable.
The trial court was correct in relying on the statute.
More importantly, even if the trial court's specific rationale
was not proper, the trial court's denial of attorney fees should
still be affirmed if there is another appropriate justification for
the denial.

Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah Ct. App.

1995) (trial court's stated ground for award of attorney fees was
improper,

but

award

was

affirmed

because

alternative

grounds

existed). Nield and Draper provide ample alternative authority for
the denial of attorney fees, and confirm that plaintiffs' complaint
and motion for attorney fees were without merit.
C.

There Is Adequate Evidence Of Bad Faith; Any Lack Of

Sufficient Evidence Is Harmless.
The trial court's stated ground for the award of attorney fees
is Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) .

An award of attorney fees

under that statute requires proof that the offending claim both
lacked merit and was made in bad faith.
141, 151

(Utah 1983).

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d

Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's
12

finding that their second cause of action, which sought an award of
attorney fees, was made in bad faith. The trial court's finding in
this respect must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Jeschke v.
Willis. 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In Cady, the Utah Supreme Court vacated an award of attorney
fees where the offending claim was clearly without merit, but the
only evidence of bad faith was the party's failure to research the
issue as instructed by the trial court.

The trial court concluded

that adequate research would have disclosed that the claim was
without merit.

671 P.2d at 152.

The Utah Supreme Court held this

alone was not sufficient evidence of bad faith.

Id.

The Court

also approvingly cited a prior case which held that bad faith could
be shown by evidence of "self-induced myopia."

id.

(citation

omitted).
Application of the bad faith elements articulated in Cady is
illustrated in Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), which
found bad faith in the wrongful pursuit of a foreclosure sale
against real property.

Burton had obtained a judgment against Mr.

Wood just after Mr. Wood had conveyed title to the property to Mrs.
Wood.

Mrs. Wood was Baldwin's predecessor in interest.

Even

though a subsequent title report showed that the judgment lien had
attached to the property, and even though the literal language of
the fraudulent conveyance statute gave some support to Burton's
argument that the Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood conveyance was void, the

13

Utah

Supreme

Court

affirmed

the

attempt was made in bad faith.

finding

that

the

foreclosure

850 P.2d at 1199.

The evidence of bad faith in the instant case is equally as
strong as in Baldwin.

Defendants' attorney, Craig M. Snyder,

testified in his affidavit that he had explained to plaintiffs'
counsel that plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was without merit
because

defendant

property

and

had

Miller

had

signed

a

plaintiffs' counsel.

disclaimed

quit

(R. 26-23.)

claim

any
deed

interest
as

in

requested

the
by

Mr. Snyder also explained to

plaintiffs' counsel that defendants Anderson had never claimed an
interest

in

the

subject

property.

Plaintiffs

nevertheless

persisted in pursuing a claim for attorney fees which they had been
told, and should have known, was groundless.

The trial court also

noted the excessive amount of fees claimed.
Evidence of bad faith may also be found in subsequent events,
based on the logic of the cases cited by plaintiffs which permit
looking at pre-complaint events to determine if post-complaint
actions were in bad faith.

On June 16, 1995, more than a month

before the trial court's ruling, defendants disclosed the Draper
case to the court and to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

nonetheless

continued to persist in their unfounded quest for attorney fees,
including

by

filing

several

Additional

evidence

of

plaintiffs

have failed,

bad

objections
faith

in their

is

to

found

the
in

court's
the

order.

fact

that

filings with this Court, to

acknowledge the existence of Nield and Draper, both of which are

14

controlling adverse decisions. Utah R. Prof. Con. 3.3(a)(3). The
trial court properly found that plaintiffs had pursued their
request for attorney fees in bad faith.
Even if there is insufficient evidence of bad faith, however,
the award of attorney fees should still be affirmed.

Defendants/

counterclaims advanced two alternative bases for an award of
attorney fees: Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, and Utah R. Civ. P. 11.
Rule 11 does not require a lack of bad faith, only a lack of
reasonable inquiry. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah
1992) . For the reasons stated elsewhere in this brief, defendants
submit that the plaintiffs could not have made a reasonable
inquiry.

Although perfect research is not required, id., in none

of the cases cited by plaintiffs was there an award of precomplaint attorney fees.

The language of the statute itself only

authorizes an award of attorney fees incurred "in the action."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

Review of the digest headnotes under

"quieting title" or "libel and slander," both of which were
relevant

to

plaintiffs'

claim

for

damages

resulting

from

defendants' failure to disclaim title, would have revealed both the
Draper and the Nield cases, and at a minimum would have revealed
the lack of any other case authorizing an award of pre-complaint
attorney fees.

Defendants therefore respectfully assert that

plaintiffs could not have made a reasonable inquiry concerning
their claimed right to pre-complaint attorney fees.

15

The apparent lack of inquiry in this case is similar to that
discussed in Backstrom Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 751 P. 2d
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where the court awarded double coasts
attorney fees on appeal because the attorney should have realized
that the judgment was not final and appealable.

The award of

attorney fees in the instant case was appropriate and should be
affirmed.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
EVEN THOUGH THEY PREVAILED ON THEIR QUIET TITLE CLAIMS.
Section II of plaintiffs' brief argues that plaintiffs should
have been awarded their attorney fees because plaintiffs prevailed
in quieting title to their property, and because

(according to

plaintiffs) defendant Miller should have acquiesced in plaintiffs7
earlier demands to sign a quit claim deed.
merit.

This claim has no

Two Utah Supreme Court cases establish that there is no

right of action in Utah for recovery of pre-complaint damages for
failure to disclaim

an interest

in property.

Jack B. Parson

Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 1988); Draper v. J.
B. & R. B. Walker, Inc.. 115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826, 829 (1949).
Sound policy arguments support the result of these two cases.
Under plaintiffs' proposed rule, an individual could repeatedly
force his or her neighbors to sign quit claim deeds affirming that
the neighbors claimed no interest in the individual's property.

A

more realistic example might be an individual, whose property was
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regularly traversed by neighborhood children, requiring each of the
neighbors

to

frequently

formally

disclaim

any

prescriptive

easement.

If the neighbor refused, the individual could hire an

attorney to make persuasive and thoroughly researched arguments as
to why the neighbor had no interest in the individual's property,
and then expect payment for the attorney fees thus incurred.
Defendants acknowledge that there are circumstances where a
neighbor

perhaps

should

sign

a

quit

claim

deed.

The

Utah

Legislature has, however, provided a speedy and effective remedy
for any failure to disclaim:

filing a quiet title action. Had the

conduct of which plaintiffs now complain occurred after the filing
of the complaint, plaintiffs might have had cause to seek attorney
fees.

Because defendants did not resist the quiet title claim in

plaintiffs' complaint, however, no fees may be awarded.
The statute on which plaintiffs based their claim, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56(1), does not permit an award of fees in this
situation.

The statute states:

In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action
or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
By its terms, this statute applies only to defenses to an
action, i.e., a lawsuit.

Defendants made no defense to the quiet

title portion of plaintiffs' action.
was not made in bad in faith.
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It follows that the defense

This

Court

need

not

decide

whether

there

might

be

some

situations other than this case where it might be appropriate to
award

attorney

complaint.

fees

for work

undertaken

prior

to

filing

the

The Draper and Nield cases establish that such an award

is not permissible under the facts of this case.
Section

III

of

plaintiffs'

brief

claims

that

there

is

significant precedent and authority elsewhere for an award of precomplaint attorney fees.

Defendants submit that none of the cases

cited by plaintiffs support plaintiffs' assertion.

In none of the

cases was an award of pre-complaint attorney fees actually made or
affirmed.

In addition, the only proposition that any of the cases

might stand for is that pre-complaint actions might be admissible
as evidence of bad faith and thereby support an award of postcomplaint attorney fees, a proposition which is not at issue in
this case.
For example, Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), contains no
indication that any attorney fees were awarded for pre-complaint
services.

The case only holds that the evidence of bad faith may

be drawn from actions both before and during the lawsuit.

412 U.S.

at 15.
Plaintiffs cite Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1990) as supporting that a litigant might be entitled to prelitigation attorney fees.

The case never made such a statement,

and the statement which plaintiffs apparently refer to was not a
holding.

What the case stated was:
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"We shall assume, without

deciding, that on a proper

showing

appellant would

have been

entitled to attorneys' fees for the pre-litigation conduct of RSA."
572 A.2d at 112 (emphasis added).

That sentence was preceded by a

discussion showing that there was a debate among the federal courts
"over whether the bad faith exception applies to pre-litigation
conduct."

Id (italics in original).

It is unclear from Schlank

and the cases cited in it whether the debate is over pre-complaint
evidence or pre-complaint attorney fees.

What is clear, however,

is that neither Schlank nor the cases cited in it made any award of
pre-complaint attorney fees.
Plaintiffs further claim that "numerous other state courts
have held that an award of attorney's fees is warranted by
faith'

or

^obduracy'

during

(Plaintiffs' brief at p. 26.)

the

pre-litigation

time

x

bad

period."

In support of this proposition,

plaintiffs cite only two cases, both from New Hampshire.

Neither

case supports awarding pre-complaint attorney fees.
Harkeem v. Adams, 377 A.2d 617 (N.H. 1977), involved a claim
that the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security had acted
in bad faith in opposing the plaintiff's claim for unemployment
benefits.

The trial court found the state had acted in bad faith,

awarded benefits of $1,104.00, and awarded attorney fees of onethird the amount of the recovery.

Such an award of attorney fees

for bad faith litigation had not been previously authorized in New
Hampshire.

In Harkeem, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted a

rule authorizing such an award of attorney fees and affirmed the
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trial court. Although some statements in the opinion might seem to
support an award of attorney

fees "where

it should have been

unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action,"
377 A.2d at 619 (citation omitted), the comments are dictum because
the trial court awarded attorney fees based on a percentage of the
recovery, without respect to when the fees were incurred.
safely assume that the $368.00

in attorney

One may

fees did not even

adequately cover the proceedings during the case itself.
Griffin v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security,
370 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1977) expressly did not decide anything about
attorney fees.

370 A.2d at 282.

That issue was not decided until

Harkeem.
In other words, plaintiffs have given no support for their
claim

that

"significant

jurisdictions

for

an

precedent

award

of

and

authority"

pre-litigation

from

other

attorney

fees.

Plaintiffs have identified only one court which has stated, in
dictum, that it might award such fees.

Plaintiffs do not attempt

to distinguish, nor even acknowledge the existence of, the two Utah
Supreme Court cases that squarely hold that a cause of action for
wrongful refusal to disclaim title is not recognized in Utah.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DOUBLE COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL.
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates
an award of damages, which may include double costs, if an appeal
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is frivolous.

Subdivision (b) of that rule defines a frivolous

appeal as one that "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law."

Defendants respectfully assert

that this appeal is frivolous and that an award of attorney fees
and

double

costs,

assessed

against

appellants'

attorney,

is

appropriate.
Double costs and attorney fees have been awarded against an
appealing party where the attorney should have discovered, after
careful consideration, that the appeal lacked merit.

Backstrom

Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

This Court could reasonably determine that plaintiffs'

counsel should have discovered the cases cited in Point I of this
memorandum and thereby learned that this case was without merit.
The Court does not, however, need to rely on a "should have known"
analysis.

Plaintiffs

had

actual

notice.

On June

16, 1995,

defendants' counsel submitted a letter to the trial court, a copy
of which was mailed to plaintiffs' attorney, calling the court's
attention to the Draper case.

(Copy of letter attached.)

A copy

of the case was attached to the letter, and the relevant holding
was quoted in the letter.

In addition, both Draper and Nield were

discussed in detail in defendants' summary disposition memoranda
filed previously

in this appeal.

Notwithstanding

this actual

notice that existing Utah law barred plaintiffs' action, plaintiffs
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have never attempted to distinguish the Draper or Nield cases or to
argue that they should be modified or reversed.
Where, as here, the judgment for attorney fees below was based
on a determination that the action was without merit, the appellate
court should also award attorney fees on appeal.

Utah Department

of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P. 2d 1193, 1197-98 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) . Such an award of attorney fees and double costs can be made
even where there is no showing of bad faith.

O'Brien v. Rush, 744

P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
If an award of attorney fees and double costs is required
where a litigant simply should have known that the action was
without

merit,

the

award

is

compelled

in

this

case

where

plaintiffs' attorney had actual knowledge of two controlling cases
which defeated any right of action.

Plaintiffs were required, but

failed, to acknowledge the existence of those case in arguing for
summary disposition, because they had not yet been disclosed to
this Court by opposing counsel. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
3.3(a)(3).

Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees

and double costs incurred in responding to this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The issued raised by appellants have been previously decided.
Utah does not recognize any cause of action for wrongful refusal to
disclaim an interest in property.

Defendants promptly disclaimed

any interest in the subject property after plaintiffs' lawsuit was
filed.

Plaintiffs therefore may not recover attorney fees.
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Plaintiffs'

claim

for

attorney

fees

had

no

merit,

plaintiffs persisted in pursuing the claim in bad faith.
appeal is likewise pursued in bad faith.

and
This

The judgment of the trial

court should be affirmed, and defendants should be awarded double
costs and attorney fees.
DATED this 7th day of August, 1996.
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June 16, 1995

Hon. Guy R. Burningham
Fourth District Judge
125 North 100 West
Provo, UT 84601
Re:

CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN v. JANICE MILLER et al.
Case No. 950400145

Dear Judge Burningham:
Attached is the case of Draper v. J. B. & R. B. Walker. Inc.. 204 P.2d 826 (Utah 1949)
which came to my attention after our Memorandum in Opposition to PlaintifPs Cross Motion
For Attorney Fees and the Plaintiffs Reply Brief had already been submitted. In relevant part,
Draper. 204 P.2d at 829, states:
If, however, there is no duty to affirmatively act, but only to disclaim in event
of suit, then no recovery may be had regardless of the unreasonableness of the
refusal. At the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a
refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property.
(citations omitted). We are not aware of any statute which would modify the common law rule.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Respectfully,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

Craig M. Snyder
Enclosure
cc:

Gordon D u v a l ,

Esq.

"

